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Alrhough computers are being used for many
applications in the military, the area of tactical decision-
support is of the most critical importance. This area
combines the many aspects of typical business decision-
support with an urgency which is only found in the practice
of war. The Tactical Commander must select a course of
action which will result in the attainment of certain goals
(e.g. the destruction cf enemy forces or the survival of
one's own forces) .
It is the potential for the less of many human lives
and, more importantly, the consequences of failure in the
political-military effort which makes this problem so
critical. Because of its crucial nature, tactical decision-
support is the area where we will focus our design.
2. The Problem
Simply stated, the problem is to provide the
tactical commander with decision-support which is responsive
to his needs under all circumstances. We will adopt an

approach to this problem which we feel will be different
from current systems, and which represents an alternative
that will prove beneficial. The difference is in the way we
will approach the problem, and in the way in which we
control the solution to the problem. He believe our
approach will result in a more flexible, extendable, and
adaptable system.
Current systems, e.g. the World Wide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS) and the Naval Tactical
Data System (NTDS) , approach the problem from the top down.
The theory is that if conflicts can be managed at the task
force, division, or theater level, then the conflicts will
be concluded successfully.
The complexity of such systems is staggering, with
tens cf computers linked closely together and communicating
with far-flung units using radio-frequency bands. We will
approach from the opposite direction, with the belief that
well-controlled regiments produce well-controlled divisions,
and controlled divisions result in controlled armies. Our
emphasis is on providing support to the lowest level of




Only recently has this need to provide low level
support in tactical decision-making been recognized in the
military, and many units still have no capability of this
kind. Attaining this capability will be a major goal of our
design, and this will be evident in the size and speed
considerations for the proposed solution.
Additionally, we feel that current systems do not
take advantage of the full capabilities of computer systems,
and do not use intelligence in the computational
manipulation of information. He want to do more than
display the information in a way which promotes decision-
making: we want to bring the formidable abilities of the
machine to bear on the important tasks of analysis and
response. One approach to accomplish this is the
incorporation of artificial intelligence into the tactical
decision-support system (TDSS) . Although most systems use
intelligence, the explicit use of artificial intelligence
technigues has not been executed. He will use artificial
intelligence (AI) in our solution.
A very critical, perhaps the most critical,
shortcoming of current systems is the difficulty encountered
in adapting the TDSS to changing environments. In the
practice of war, tactics and weapons technology can change
11

so quickly that successive battles between forces are quite
different. X TDSS, to be truly responsive to the needs of
the tactical commander, must be able to adapt to these
chanqes rapidly. Current systems require the development
and distribution of new tactics in the form of software
packaqes to adapt to the chanqinq environment. Our proposal
is to treat chanqes to these tactics, and the resultant
chanqes in software f low-cf-control, as information which
the TDSS manages, just the same as if it were data about the
situation. This will, we believe, produce qraceful system
adaptation in the face of rapidly chanqinq tactics.
Our desiqn is presented at the uppermost loqical
level, where most of the actual implementation will be
transparent to the reader. Thus, we will not delve into the
theory of XI nor into that of database manaqement systems,
althouqh both are important to the overall desiqn. We will
instead concentrate on those areas which are different from
current solutions, and therefore less familiar to the
reader. At this level, the capability for intelliqent and
adaptable decision-support will, hopefully, be evident.
Finally, we will lake no claims as to the final
performance of such a system, althouqh we may at times speak
as thouqh such a system exists. It does not exist, and any
12

claims of either laudable or deplorable performance are
matters of speculation.
B. APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION
1. Information. Intelligence, and Decisions
a. Intelligence
For our purposes, we will consider intelligence
to be the ability to consider problems and process
information to achieve some goal or group of goals, using
known resources [ Ref 1: p. 806]. Thus, intelligence is the
accumulation and analysis cf information, and the
consideration of that information in making decisions.
Simply put, intelligence is the use of information in
prcblem solving. [Ref 2],
b. Data
The information which the human gathers using
the senses we classify as "data." The purpose of data is to
represent the real world, or the environment, to the
intelligent agent. For humans, the images produced by the
eyes, ears, nose, and the senses of touch and taste are the
world with which they deal. The representation of the world
in this way is the central contribution to comprehension.
13

Concepts which can not be represented in this manner are
more difficult to understand (e.g. relativity theory and
quantum physics).
c. Knowledge
To this data humans apply rules. These rules
allcw them to use the data in decision-making. Like data,
the rules are information, but different in nature. They
are obtained not merely by sense, but by learning.
Experience, belief, interpolation, and extrapolation are all
used by human intelligence to validate rules.
These rules we classify as "knowledge." It is
data about data and it is used to understand what data
represents and how to manipulate and analyze data to—achie-ve-
scue end (goal) .
d. The Intelligent Process
The human intelligent process is the gathering
of sensory data, combined with its perception. Perception
begins with the formation of a representation, called a
percept, from the raw data. The resulting percept may be
matched to a representation already in memory, sometimes
called a concept. Recognition takes place when a match
occurs, and when a match is not made, the percept is not
recognized. Knowledge is used in the formation and
14

manipulation of percepts and concepts [Ref 3: pp. 55-56].
Therefore, the human uses two types of information, data and
knowledge, and the intelligent process is impossible without
both.
e. Human versus Machine
Although computers and humans are obviously
different in nature, the human min-d and the central
processing unit (CPU) of the computer are similar in many
ways. A brief example might suffice. A human job foreman
is given the task of allocating his resources to meet some
pre-defined objective. He has constraints placed upon him
frcm various sources: all jobs assigned must be accomplished
within a certain time-fra"me; - he has - a known limit to-
available personnel; he is expected to get maximum use of
his assigned personnel; and job turnaround time is expected
to be minimized.
These constraints represent some of the rules
under which the foreman operates. The data he uses are the
jots assigned, job reguirements, and so on. Using this
information, the foreman schedules the work and monitors
progress.
We contend that the foreman's task is one which
reguires intelligence. The analogy to the computer follows
15

directly from this contention. Sines the job scheduler is
an important part of any operating system which supports
multiprogramming, such operating systems are intelligent.
Although the human and the machine system
display intelligence in seme cemmon areas, it is apparent
that the methods are quite different. Humans display a
prcperty which, for lack cf a more technical understanding,
is called "insight." The ability to focus on the
fundamentals of an object promotes efficient storage of
representations and rapid access to those representations.
Insight, we feel, is a peculiarly human characteristic,
which we will not attempt to precisely define.
Seme methods for approximating insight, such as
the use of dense indexes and heuristics, have proven
successful. These methods are appropriate because computers
perform simple operations rapidly. If a complex operation
is well-understood and can be decomposed into a series of
smaller operations, the computer can accomplish the
operation 7ery efficiently. Less well-understood problems
take much longer and are less efficient.
It is also helpful, in the computer system, to
differentiate explicitly between data and knowledge. The
line drawn between the levels of information is arbitrary
16

and arguable, but computers need this explicit distinction
tc operate efficiently. It should be noted that humans need
not make such explicit categorizations and the distinction
varies depending upon the problem being considered.
Implementation cf cur design will make use of
"artificial insight" in the use of dense indexes especially,
as well as other methods. Although this will result in
increased storage (space) requirements, the time saved is
considered worth the additional space,
f. The Decision Process
We believe that the process of decision-making
adheres to a few fundamental principles. First, information
is gathered and added to the store of information already
onhand. " Predecisions" are made during this phase, such as
what action to take when inconsistent information is
encountered. These predecisions are judgements which are
made to reduce the ambiguity of the situation represented by
the information. Predecision uses knowledge about
information limitations, in ensuring that information
conforms to those limits. Both data and knowledge may be
accumulated during this phase.
Next, the collected information is analyzed to
arrive at an accurate summary, or perception, of the
17

situation. This analysis consists of the consideration of
various aspects of the situation, and usually involves a
computation to arrive at a summary representation.
Then, the decision process compares the
resources used by the various solutions considered during
analysis, and compares the results of each of the solutions.
Each result will have some relative value to the decision-
maker. A good, rational decision would be one in which the
resource expenditure and the goal achievement were
optimized.
The whole process can thus be decomposed into
three phases: acquisition of information; analysis; and
decision. The outcome of the process depends on the
successful execution of all three phases.
2. The Tactical Envircnaent
For our application area, that of tactical decision-
making, our chosen scenario is as follows:
A O.S. naval vessel is at sea during a period of
escalating international tension. Information concerning
potentially hostile vessels and aircraft is available to the
ship's Tactical Action Officer (TAO) from various sources:
intelligence sources, his own ship's sensors, etc. The TAO
is faced with the task of identifying, by type and threat, a
18

host of potentially hostile contacts. All available
information must be used tc the greatest extent possible to
maximize the chance of survival in the event that
hostilities break out.
Several assumptions are made concerning the nature
of the tactical situations which we forsee:
• Peacetime behavior may bear little or no
resemblence to behavior during the various phases of an
escalating crisis.
• Electronic warfare will be used to deny
hostile forces the use cf sensors/communications and to
ensure friendly forces use cf the same.
• Long-range strikes will include combinations
of platforms with various levels cf intelligent control
(cruise missiles, tactical .ballistic missiles, manned
aircraft)
.
• Rules of engagement (ROE) will change rapidly
during escalation phases of a crisis, probably using
combinations of predetermined rules.
We should emphasize that our choice of scenario is
purely arbitrary. A land-based missile battery or a
squadron of bombers would face similar situations and
circumstances. The problei is cf a generic nature.
19

methods of attack are fast, with little or no
warning, and they are deadly, with a single hit powerful
enough to destroy or disable most modern units. Two factors
will be most critical in the struggle to survive in a
hostile environment: mobility and flexibility. We should
have learned from the "great" wars of history that no amount
of firepower will offset a weakness in either of these two
areas. The tactical environment is predominantly one of
rapidly changing circumstances which affect the various
decisions of the commander. On an individual basis, each
tactical commander's goal is to win the first battle of the
next war. Situational uncertainty will severely hamper
achieving this goal.
Sub-sonic, ground-skimming cruise missiles or super-
sonic, high-altitude missiles, both eguipped with
conventional warheads, will probably present the worst
threat. In either case, assuming current technology, the
time from initial detection of the missile to impact will be
approximately seven (7) minutes. Thus, the tactical
commander will have a limited amount of time to process a
large amount of information and make critical decisions
regarding his unit's survival. The commander's most
effective use of all of his available resources is largely
20

dependent upon his overall knowledge of the current
situation. The need for accurate and up-to-date
intelligence information is magnified when one considers the
scenario described above. He must provide the commander
this information to assist him in making the correct
decisions concerning mobility, flexibility, and survival.
3. Requirement for Adaptability
At this point it must be re-emphasized that the
tactical environment is one of rapidly changing
circumstances. Military forces in peacetime train to fight
the type of warfare which is expected in the next war.
Historically, predictions cf future conflicts have been poor
(at least those by the military leadership entrusted with
doctrinal training)
.
The fruit lessness of some predictions can be
gathered from the fact that most of the standing armies of
Europe (and the U.S.) had combat cavalry units at the
outbreak of World War I, although the principal warfare of
that era turned out to be trench warfare. At the beginning
of World War II, the concensus among the Allies was that
battleships and the Maginot Line would be the predominant
factors; of course, aircraft carriers and blitzkrieg guickly
ended that thought. We could gc on, discussing the
21

surprises of Vietnam or the Six Day War, but the lesson is
already clear: dcn»t become entrenched in the tactics
practiced in peacetime.
What is expected in peace may have little
resemblence to what happens in war. Secrets are kept which
are designed to produce uncertainty, throwing the enemy off-
balance long enough to exploit his weaknesses. The
inability to adapt to meet unpredictable threats quickly
encugh is the most fatal flaw a military commander may
posess. Conversely, the ability to adapt and take advantage
of new circumstances has long been the hallmark of great
military genius. It is this adaptability which we feel is
lacking in-current command and control systemspand which we
have included in our system as a salient design feature.
22

II. GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTIO N
A. PREFACE
This chapter consists cf three separate sections. The
first section provides a general description of the major
components and characteristics of a typical knowledge-based
computer system. This is intended to acquaint the reader
with the basic concepts underlying our decision-support
system, TAC*. Then, what we feel is a practical and
understandable example is given. This example should
provide the reader with a basic understanding of the
operation or"- an intelligent^ adaptable system.- Finally, the
basic system configuration and operation of our design is
presented.
B. GENERAL
There are many possible variations for a knowledge-based
decision-support system, but they all consist of three basic
components in one form or another. Such a system may be
thought of as being a composition of a database, some sort
of control mechanism, and a set of rules [Ref 4: p. 4],
The database (DB) is merely a repository for all of the
current data about the environment. It is a collection of
23

all known facts. As one would surmise, a dynamic
environment implies that the DB is continually being
updated. Additional information, mere recent information,
and entirely new information are the three types of data
that are stored in the DB. The following example
incorporates the three types of information.
Information concerning the retail price of an
automobile may be stored in the DB. As information about
sales volume becomes available, the inclusion of this data
into the DB would constitute additional information. If,
due to inflation, the retail price for the automobile is
increased by, say $200.00, this new price would represent
mere recent information. When an entirely new model of
automobile is introduced on the market, such information
would be classified as new information. The DE does not
analyze any type of information, but merely stores it.
The rules may be thought of as being a disjoint set of
conditions which have unique responses associated with each.
In programming, this is analagous to a series of "IF. ..THEN"
statements. It is through these rules that an understanding
of the data stored in the DE is achieved. Like the data in
the DB, these rules may also undergo change based upon the
environment. Three types of change are possible: addition,
24

deletion, and revision of rules. New rules may need to be
added when a changing environment creates a situation that
is not currently covered by the existing set of rules. When
the environment changes, some rules may no longer be
applicable. Rather than occupying space in the system,
these rules should be deleted. Also, different
circumstances may trigger a need to revise an existing rule.
We will call the repository for system knowledge about the
environment a knowledge base (KB) . The combination of a
dynamic DB and a dynamic KB work in concert to provide a
consistent view of the real world for the system user.
The responsibility for insuring that necessary changes
are made lies with the control mechanism. All inputs to the
system first pass through the controller where a
differentiation is made between pure data and rule changes.
Data is sent to the DB while rule changes go to the KB. It
might be convenient to think cf the controller as an
interface between the DB and the KB because it is in this
component where applicable rules are applied to the
corresponding data, changes to both the DB and KB are
initiated, and appropriate action (or non-action) is




The preceding section has given a very basic overview of
a knowledge-based decision-support system, describing the
three major components. Although such a system is much more
complex than this summary indicates, especially when one
considers the possible system variations, an attempt was
made to lay the foundation for understanding the detailed
explanation of our prototype system, TAC*, which follows in
Chapter III.
C. PRACTICAL EXAMPLE
As an example of the operation of an intelligent and
adaptable system, we will consider a professional football
team. This example is understandable for most people and
also has a direct analogy to the operation of our decision-
support system. In the tactical environment, the overall
goal is to win the battle. . Similarly, on the football
field, the goal is to win the game.
1. Resources
Because the total number of players a team may have
is strictly controlled, there is a definite limitation to
the coach's available resources. However, the athletic
potential, or capabilities, of all players is not controlled
nor are these capabilities identical. Therefore, the
overall quality of a team's resources will vary from one
26

professional organization to another. The ccach must
attempt to win each game based upon these number and quality
constraints.
2. Game Preparation
Football teams practice in preparation for actual
games. The overall game strategy and specific plays are
developed based upon what is expected to occur during the
game. Thus, a certain amount of prediction is necessary in
preparation for the game. The coaches are trying to predict
(into the future) those plays that the opposition will try.
Before each game, the opposing team* s strengths and
weaknesses are studied. Data about the other team's
tendencies is accumulated and analyzed, thus giving the
coaching staff seme knowledge about the opponent.
Eventually, the coaching staff arrives at conclusions as to
what the other team is likely to do in specific situations
throughout the game. (Since each team has different
strengths and weaknesses, these conclusions will change from
game to game.) The conclusions are then written down in the
form of plays that the team will use during the game. This
sequence of plays is called a "game plan." In essence, the
plays are the rules that the team will follow throughout the
contest. There is another type of rule which the team
27

follows in both the preparation for and the actual play of
the game. These are the rules of the league. For example,
each team may only have eleven players on the field during
the execution of a play, an offensive player may not block a
defensive player below the waist, etc. Both types of rules
are combined and determine the flow of action during the
game. Incidentally, those league rules are enforced by the
referees in an actual game. Generally speaking, the
referees oversee all action en the field. When a team's
action or formation conflicts with the league rules, the
referees dssQSs a penalty against the offending team and,
thus, resolve the conflict.
In summary, then, at the opening kickoff , each team
has accumulated data about the ether team and each has been
able to gain some knowledge about the other based upon the
analysis of the data.
3. Playing The Gaae
At the outset of the game, a team wants to follow
the overall strategy as defined in its game plan. For
example, in a particular situation, the plan may call for
the guarterback to throw a short pass to the tight end ten
yards from the line of scrimmage and near the sideline.
However, the coaching staff realizes that their opponents
28

may try to win the game by making changes to their own plays
during the coarse of the game. These changes may render a
particular play ineffective. Fcr example, the opposing team
may decide to have two defenders play against the tight end,
instead of one, and the sideline pass mentioned above may
not be able to be completed with the new defensive coverage.
Therefore, the coaching staff will have several personnel
positioned high above the field to detect any such changes
in the defensive coverage and suggest alternate plays to
call which will be effective against the new defense. A
good choice might be a play run earlier which was successful
against the opposition's present defense. This would entail
projecting hack in -time, to fdncL the.„s.uccess£ul_ .play*. . JJJiis
group of people monitors the action on the field, but
becomes the controller of the action when changes occur. In
essence, the group determines when the game plan is no
longer effective and tries to adapt to new situations by
changing the rules that their team will follow during the
remainder of the game. Further, their recommended changes
must be made as quickly as possible to preclude the opposing





A successful professional football team may be
characterized as being an intelligent organization which
utilizes data to derive knowledge about its opponents and an
organization which is capable of changing the rules under
which it operates when the situation changes. The catalyst
which insures that the team is rapidly adaptable is the
group of controllers positioned above the action on the
field. While this group selects a particular play that will
hopefully be successful, the guarterbacJc makes the final
decision as to which play is actually to be run. For
example, if the group tells the quarterback to run play "x",
and when the team deploys at the line of scrimmage, an
unexpected defensive alignment may be applied by the
opposing team. So, the quarterback will change the play to
be run by calling a special set of numbers at the line of
scrimmage which signify play "y."
The next section should reflect a remarkable
similarity between the operation of a professional football




D. TAC*: BASIC DESCSIPTIOH
Essentially, TAC* is an intelligent computer system
which utilizes currant information about the real world,
stored in its dynamic "infobase", to understand changes
which occur in the real world. Besides the routine changes
which occur due to the passing of time or the movement of
units, a change may also signal a "conflict" between data
items and knowledge rules. A conflict is an inconsistency
reguiring a decision by some agent which results in a
consistent database. A conflict may be classified into one
of three areas:
1. Those that occur due to technological or
informational limitations; e.g. Two known ships pass within
"x" meters of each ether. Both ships are being tracked,
however there exists an area wherein it becomes impossible
to differentiate between these ships. This resolution
limitation of our current technology poses obvious problems
in determining which ship is sailing what course as both
emerge from the ambiguous area.
2. Those that require Forward Prediction; e.g.
Intelligence sources are tracking a flight of known hostile
planes when, suddenly, the flight disappears. It is
imperative that we be able to project forward in time giving
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th€ ultimate target, or at least the heading, for this
flight of hostile planes.
3. Those that require Backward Prediction; e.g.
Intelligence sources report a troop tuild-up of known size
has occured during the past 24 hours in Eastern Europe. We
must ascertain whether the force is mechanized cr armored,
which other units might be in support, etc. Backward
Prediction allows us to project backward in time to a
verified, real-world situation in order to ultimately
identify the unit in question. Time, distance, overall
logistics capabilities, available means of movement, etc.
must be considered.
As can be seen from the above examples, TAC* should
prove to be an invaluable tool in both tactical and
strategic planning, with specific applications for all
branches of the military services.
The three major components of TAC* are the controller
(CCN) , the database management subsystem (DBMS) , and the
knowledge base management subsystem (K3MS) . The controller
may be thought of as a "world watcher" with the
responsibility of taking control of the system when a
conflict arises or information changes are needed. Direct
interaction with the database manager (DBM) insures that the
32

results of all updates to the database are known by the
controller, thus insuring that all conflicts are detected.
Corresponding to the database is a knowledge base which, in
essence, is a set of rules that the database must abide by;
i.e. an armored brigade cannot move 1000 miles in a six hour
period, or an aircraft carrier is net capable of making a
180 degree turn within a 200 meter space. Such restrictions
might be termed "data constraints."
This brief overview of TAC* should be adequate to
proceed on a common level and, hopefully, will enable us to
understand the detailed system description which follows.
Then we will be able tc focus our attention on specific





The purpose of TAC* is to analyze the real-world and,
based on rules provided to the system, to advise the
decision-maker on a course of action. To do this, TAC* must
be able to understand the real-world. The real-world is
represented to TAC* by the database (DB) . A DB is a series
of records which contain information about objects and their
relationships with ether objects.
A record is a structured collection of data, each
substructure of which is called a "field." These fields
represent abstract properties of an object, called
"attributes." Each attribute has an associated value. The
fields of a record contain values for the attributes of the
object which is represented by that record.
1 . Areas of Interest
The example we have chesen is of a naval vessel on
the open sea (i.e. no land mass). The area surrounding that
vessel is its "area of interest" (AOI) . An AOI represents a
section of the real world. Position within an ACI will be
represented using a coordinate system. Notice that the
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definition of AOI depends upon the point of vie u (tactical
responsibility) of the user command. For the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the entire globe may be their AOI. However, for a
single small unit, the AOI will generally correspond to the
area in which the unit is operating. The size of the area
will depend on the capability of the unit and the limits of
the defense perimeter.
2. States
The condition of a system can be described in terms
of its ••state." State is the term which we shall use to
identify the condition of the TAC* system, the real-world
situation represented in the TAC* DB, and the individual
object-records in that DB.
An object state will be that combination of record
fields which describes the status of the object. For most
objects, this will comprise the position, identification,
and warfare status fields. Certain rules in the KB will
pertain to allowable object transitions from one state to
another. Only transitions which obey these rules will be
allowed to occur automatically. Transitions violating these
object transition rules may be held pending and made known




An area state value describes the evaluation of an
area of interest. Area states take on values which
represent a tactical view of the AOI. Ship types and
capabilities, relative positioning and political situations
all contribute to the evaluation of an area state. Area
states are summaries of all of the local (object) states
within that area. A change to a local state may affect the
area state, but an area state cannot change without a change
to an object state.
Area state values are determined by object states.
They are computational and analytical summations of the set
of objects included in that area. The area state value is
determined following each valid DB update. It is this area
state which the system uses to determine what action, if
any, to take.
The system state takes en values which describe the
current system status. For example, the system may be
"idle" with no pending operations. Or it may be updating
the DB, or analyzing the results of an update, or updating
the KB.
We avoid the use of local and global states to avoid
ambiguity. Instead, we will consider object states and area
states and their associated transitions. Depending upon the
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sccpe of the system and the rules in the KB, an object in
one system may be an area (AOI) in another (smaller) system.
In our example, we deal with a single ship^ system, and
therefore the objects are ether individual platforms and the
area is the ship's AOI.
3. DETAILED HODULE DESCRIPTIONS
1. Interface
a. Input
Our system is essentially symbiotic in nature,
relying upon raw information from other sources to feed its
database. In order to do this reliably, an input subsystem
with appropriate capabilities must be used.
The system is message oriented and designed to
operate with multiple incuts and with multiple priority
messages. Three major source classes for messages must be
considered: system and operator generated, intrinsic sensor
generated, and externally generated.
System and operator generated messages are the
easiest to handle. System messages occur only as a result
of some state change. When a new state value has as its
action a data or rule transaction, the system generates a
message which is forwarded to the input spooler (via the
output spooler) . Next, the operator may enter a message to
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the system. Most KB changes, and some DB update/request
messages will be created in this way.
The next most important general source class is
intrinsic sensor. Sensing devices on the user platform will
have a message formatting translator to allow direct input
to the input spool. These inputs from ship sensors (radar,
sonar, ESM) will be multiplexed and queued according to
priority.
The final major source class is externally
generated reports. The best examples of these are
intelligence reports, OPREf-3 messages, NTDS Link 11/14 type
intercommunication, and ONITREPs. All of this information
originates outside the ship and is received via radio
receiving units. These radio messages must be
decrypted/translated and channelled to the input spooler. A
separate processing system may te needed to do this in order
to insure rapid access to external data.
All of these sources meet at one destination:
the Input Spooling Process (ISP). The purposes of the ISP
are:




• To act as a buffer during high volume traffic
periods.
• To feed transactions one at a time into the
Input Selector Switch.
The ISP may be considered to be a smart queuing
device. If it is expected that large amounts of data will
be incoming, the system may schedule the ISP more
freguently; more sensibly, the system design is amenable to
some multiprocessing and the ISP could easily use a
dedicated processing unit.
b. Output
Like the Input Spooling Process, the Output
Spooling Process manages the flow of information out of the
system. Output destinations fall into four major
categcries: operator, system, intrinsic, and external.
Operator messages are advice or orders to the
operator. The result of some rule invocations may be to
inform the decision-maker of a new level of readiness which
must be achieved. Or it may notify the operator that an
invalid object state transition was attempted, and ask for
instructions to complete the pending action.
System message outputs, as mentioned above,
allow the system to feed back to itself. Some area states
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might require this, or a change in a KB item affecting the
current state may produce this result. It should be
considered an infreguent action.
Correlation of two objects in the database may
result in intrinsic sensor action. The need for additional
or mere detailed surveillance information could also cause
the system to send a message to a sensor station. For
example, a report received on an unidentified subsurface
contact may neglect to include a depth. TAC* may then
prompt the sonar team for this information, or request a
change in mode to determine depth, or estimate it for them
based on current sea conditions.
In certain situations, it may be advantageous
for TAC* to generate messages and send them directly to the
Navy Telecommunications System for broadcast. Periodic
situation summaries or high-priority operational reports
could be easily handled by TAC*, enabling the tactical
commander to concentrate on the situation at hand.
Naturally, this capability could be modified to allow human
intervention and editing prior to transmission, and this
ability could be disabled during those periods of emission
control when transmission is not desired.
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As with input the system will handle output
communications with spooling. An Output Spooling Process
(OSP) would receive and forward output messages to their
destinations. Multiple spooling by class would te used to
ensure quick response. One spooler would handle the
operator interface, another the intrinsic sensors, and
another the external broadcast channel. A separate spooler
is not needed for the system messages, as the ISP will spool
that class of message anyway. The OSP Intrinsic Sensor
Spool could also execute the demultiplexing process.
2. Control Subsystem (CON)
The Control Subsystem acts as the highest level of
control for the TAC* system. Input to and output from the
TAC* system are through the modules of the Control Subsystem
(CON) . CON has two basic functions:
• To decide the destination of an incoming
message.
• To decide the destination of outgoing actions.
CON has four components: the State Comparison Module
(SCM) , the Log Recorder (LCG) , the Response Driver (DRIVER)
,




a. Input Selection Module (ISM)
The Input Selection Module (ISM) is the
gatekeeper for the TAC* system. Messages are received from
the Input Spooling Process and the determination is made as
to whether the message is a data transaction (DTX) or a rule
transaction (RTX)
. DTX traffic is routed to the DBMS
Subsystem via the DBMS Ingate. RTX traffic is routed to the
State Comparison Module.
Selection in the ISM is accomplished by a simple
boolean (bit) check. A message is either a DTX or an RTX,
but net both. A DTX message is placed in the DBMS Ingate,
which acts as a mailbox. RTX messages require different
handling, and are first checked by the State Comparison
Module.
b. State Comparison Hodule (SCM)
The State Comparison Module (SCM) also performs
selection, but this is more complicated than the ISM.
First, the SCM compares the input state to the current area
state of the system. Based upon this comparison, and the
knowledge of where the input state originated, the SCM
decides where to send the message.
If the input is from the ISM, and the states do
not match, the message is a rule change requiring no special
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handling, and it is passed to the KBMS for action. If the
ISM is the source and states are the same, the message is an
RTX affecting the current state, and is sent to the Response
Fetch module of the KBMS for immediate handling.
The input may be from the DBMS. Specifically,
the Area-State Monitor will send its latest area state
summary to the SCM. If states do not change, the message is
simply discarded. If states do change, however, the message
is passed to the Response-Fetch module for matching and
reaction, and the current state is updated.
Thus, the State Comparison Module performs quick
matching to enable rapid system response to new rules or new
data.
c. Log Recorder (LOG)
Another function of the CON is to record the
effects and transactions on the system. This involves both
object state transitions and area state transitions.
Recording this information allows for smooth recovery of the
system from crash, from a cold start to a consistent,
accurate D3.
If properly used, the LOG can also check the
effectiveness of rule actions. Programs could be written
which would scan the Log Record and compile statistical
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performance figures on each rale, thereby allowing the
pinpointing of faulty assumptions and the correction of poor
performers. During development and tuning of new KB*s, this
could be very important, possibly allowing the test of new
rules prior to distribution to operating forces.
d. Response Driver (DRIVER)
The Response Driver (DRIVER) is the heart of the
control sub-system. While the KBMS acts as the repository
for knowledge, the DRIVER implements that knowledge. It
receives messages from the KE-MS (Response Fetch) and from
the DBMS (Object Transition Validation or OTV) modules and
converts them to inquiries, advice, or orders.
From the KBMS Response Fetch module, it gets rhe
result of rule-condition matching, which produces the
reaction part of the rules stored in the system KB. These
reactions it converts to device orders or advice to other
systems. It may also tell the OSP to send a message to the
ISP as a data transaction. These possible actions are the
programmed responses to an area state summary.
The DRIVER may also get object transition
messages from the OTV module of the DBMS, signalling that a
data transaction is being held pending due to a conflict
between the DB and the object KB. This prompt is passed to
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the user to allow him to choose the method of resolution, or
the DRIVER may be programmed to make the decision. The
chcices and the methodology of the OTV will be discussed
later.
The DRIVER is the connector to the output for
the entire system. It is this module which permits TAC* to
influence other systems and provide tactical advice.
The function of COS is to pass information to and
from the XBMS/DBMS subsystems, and to provide the framework
arcund which TAC* executes. As with the Input and Output
subsystems, it is possible that large TAC* systems would
benefit from a dedicated CON processor which would be
tightly coupled to the INPUT, OUTPUT, DBMS, and KBMS
processes. For small systems, this should not be needed.
Next we look at the Database Management Subsystem (DBMS)
.
3. Database Management Subsystem (DBMS)
The next major segment of TAC* is the Database
Management Subsystem (DBMS). It consists of six major
modules which operate together to represent a real-world
situation in data records. The parts of the DBMS allow the





The Ingate acts as the interface between the
DEMS and the input cf the system. Recall that the Input
Selection Module (ISM) of CON sends incoming data
transactions to the DBMS. These transactions are sent to
the KBMS via the KBMS Ingate.
The Ingate is a buffering and gueuing process
which allows the DBMS and ISM tc operate at different
speeds. Incoming transactions are gueued and processed in
order. A pre-emptive gueue may be used to ensure that the
most important updates get top priority. Thus, a high
precedence message would be expected to go to the top of the
queue, while low precedence messages would go to the bottom.
Alternatively, an ordering of four seperate gueues could be
used. When the DB Management Module (DBMM) is ready for the
next message, it gets the message from the Ingate.
b. Database Management Module (DBMM)
The Database Management Module (CBMM) acts to
interpret DB transactions and execute the required change
orders. Database Management System (DBMS) theory is well




To update a record, the DBMM gets that record
from the DB. A lookup must be done in the DE Index, a data
structure which is maintained by the DBMM. To promote fast
access, we envision a well-structured, dense index. This
will require more storage than that required otherwise.
Once the record is brought into main storage, a
quick check must be made to see if the pending transaction
is the most recent transaction. If it is not, the pending
transaction is entered into the archival portion of the
record and the record is put back into the DB. If a pending
transaction is more recent than the most recent already in
the current record, the pending transaction replaces the
older transaction, and the older transaction is placed into
the archival section. Prior to a "put", pending transaction
results are checked by the Object Transition Validation
Module (see below)
.
Additions of new objects and deletion of old
records is also done by the DBMM. These operations are
relatively simple as they cnly invoke the Index and the Free
Record Queue, both of which reside in the DBMM. It is
interesting to note that to be efficient in storage, the DB
Index and Free Record Queue may themselves be records in the
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DE, and only be brought into main storage when needed for
lockup and management.
Many ways of indexing and structuring databases
exist, and we will make no attempt to explain all of them
nor will we limit the applicability of our system to one
specific type. We feel that the structure of our system
permits independent (or nearly so) operation of the DBM and
KBM sub-systems. These managers are isolated from the
mechanisms by the message-handling modules of the system.
c. The Database (DE)
The Database (DE) is the collection of records
which represents the real-world to the computer. The D3
records contain information about objects in the world and
the relationships between these objects. Data about each
object is divided into two major categories: current and
archival. The current section is itself a record. It
defines the current state of a physical or abstract object
in the database. Examples of current data are: the last
kncwn position report, with associated effective time-stamp;
the generic type identification; and the warfare status.
Warfare status will define the intrinsic capabilities of
that unit (weapons on board, damage sustained, etc.).
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The archival section is a record of other
pertinent information abcut an object. Past position
reports, non-tactical information, and other non-priority
data will be retained in the archival section.
d. Object Transition Validation Hodule
When an update is received for a specific DB
object, certain validity checks may be performed to ensure
that data received is consistent. The Object Transition
Validation (OTV) Module does this by comparing the proposed
change to physical or behavioral rules which are recorded in
the knowledge base. A data transaction which conflicts with
a rule of the system will be identified and corrective
action may be taken.
For example, a data transaction reports that
object "x" is now 100 nautical miles (nm) from where it was
one hour earlier. Object "x" has been evaluated previously
as a destroyer-type ship. Now the data transaction
conflicts with the maximum possible speed for surface ships
of this type, which is 35 knots. Either the data
transaction is incorrect, the eld report was incorrect, the
evaluation was in error, or else the rule limiting surface
speeds is wrong. Such conflicts must be considered when




The OTV Module can handle such a conflict in
several ways. It may allow the data transaction to be made
and note the existence of the conflict. This would be
called "data supremacy" because the information included in
the data transaction is presumed to be correct. Conversely,
the OTV Module may reject the data transaction, and merely
ncte that the transaction was attempted, but not allowed.
This would be called "knowledge supremacy" because the
information included in the knowledge base is presumed to be
correct.
Still another alternative would be to hold the
transaction pending and inform the operator of the conflict.
The human could then make the decision as to which
information item was incorrect, and direct the completion or
abortion of the transaction. Another possibility is a
hybrid version which considers the relative amount of error,
anc permits "small" conflicts to be transacted. The
possibilities seem limitless, but all will depend upon the
supremacy of data, the supremacy of knowledge, or the
equality of data and knowledge. Under any circumstances,
each transaction will either be completed or aborted.
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e. Area State Monitor (STATE_HON)
So far, we have just considered the objects in
the database. Now we must look at the DB as a whole,
representing the state of the real wcrld as modelled by the
computer. What we need from the DB is a statement which
summarizes the conditions which exist in reality. The Area
State Monitor performs this task.
The Area State Monitor (STATE_MON) considers the
presence of physical objects in the database, and also the
values of certain abstract DB objects. For example, the
abstract DB object "Readiness_Condition" will have a value
dependent upon the declared state of readiness as
promulgated by the National Command Authority (NCA) or local
area commanders. Numbers and types of hostile units and
friendly forces will also fce considered.
From this data, the STATEJSON extracts a value
which represents the state of the area of interest (AOI)
.
This area state summary is what TAC* uses to determine what
reaction is needed/recommended. The STATE_MON computes this
summary and passes it to the Outgate for forwarding to the
Log Recorder and State Comparison Module. The STATE_MON
uses data and knowledge to derive the summary value
describing the area state. It has direct access to the KBHS
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Area Analysis Rule Subbase. These rules may be changed like
any ether item in the KE, resulting in adaptable data
analysis.
The STATE_MON is perhaps the most important of
the TAC* modules, because it performs the actual analysis of
situational data. A sub-base of the KB will be accessed by
the STATE_MON, and rules directing the computational
analysis of data will fce called and executed by the
STATE_MON.
In the football analogy, the function of the
STATE_MON is performed by the group of controllers from high
above the field and by the quarterback as he steps to the
line of scrimmage. Scanning the field of play, he notes the
disposition of the offense and defense, looks for "key"
indications of defensive intentions, and draws a rapid
conclusion. For the QB, that conclusion is whether to
execute the play called in the huddle, or to call a new play
at the line of scrimmage. Final play selection depends
almost entirely on the analysis by the QB, and he typically
has about 10 seconds in which to make his decision.
In TAC*, the STATE_MON acts like the QB in
analyzing force disposition, capabilities, and signs which
might indicate enemy intentions. It does, this
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computationally, by deriving a value for the Area State
Summary. The Summary is a group cf bits whose value depends
upon various aspects of the state.
Without actually defining a function for the
STATE_MON, it may be hard to understand, but the analogy to
the guarterback is very accurate. Detailed operation is
dependent on the implementation, and the implementation of
the Area State Monitor will be one of the most difficult
tasks in any TAC* implementation.
f. Outgate
The Outgate is the module within the DBMS which
passes messages to the other parts of the system. The
Outgate receives traffic from the DBMM and the STATE_MON.
From the DBMM, the Outgate gets the transaction order, and
frcm the STATE_MON, the Outgate gets the Area State Summary.
The data transaction and the resulting Area
State Summary are paired together at the Outgate. The
resulting message is then sent to the Log Recorder for
inclusion in the DB LOG Record. The Area State Summary is
also sent from the Outgate to the State Comparison Module.
The DBMS as described above is straight- forward and
could be generalized to any database system. It uses
knowledge to check for the validity of object transitions,
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thus ensuring a valid DB at the object level. Note that the
validation of object transitions is considered sufficient
for the validation of area state transitions (this is stated
without formal proof) . Other than the above-noted special
functions of the DBMS, it works essentially as a classical
DEMS.
i*. Knowledge Base Management Subsystem (KBMS)
The Knowledge Base Management Subsystem is the final
major segment of the TAC* System. The KBMS is the
repository and manager for the knowledge that TAC* posesses
abcut the real world. Most of its functions are analogous
to those of a classic DBMS, but there are some differences.
a. Knowledge Base Management Module (KBMM)
The Knowledge Ease Management Module (KBMM) is
that part of the KBMS which performs the DBMS-like functions
of getting, updating, and putting records in the Knowledge
Base (KB) . Messages containing updates/changes are received
by the KBMM from the State Comparison Module in the Control
Subsystem.
The KBMM takes these change messages (Rule
Transactions) and implements them on the KB. This involves
first getting the record containing the rule from the KB
file. Changes are then made to the rule according to the
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instructions of the RTX message. A rule may be deleted,
added, or its associated response altered. Once this is
accomplished, the record is placed (PUT) back into the KB
and a log message is sent to the KB Log Recorder for
temporary storage until the next KB dump.
b. Response Fetch Module (RFM)
The Response Fetch Module (RFH) of the KBMS is
used to get the appropriate Rule Response from the KB and
send it to the Response Driver in the CON Subsystem. The
input to the RFM is either a rule transaction or an Area
State Summary message from the State Comparison Module. If
the input is a rule transaction, then the associated
Response is attached to the Rule. The Response is copied,
checked, and sent to the Response Driver.
The other type of input is an Area State
Suamary, and when a summary is received, the RFM uses the
STATE value to directly access the required record. After
the record is read, the Response is sent to the Response
Driver. Accessing the Response should be fast and easy,
using a dense index in the KB.
c. The Knowledge Base (KB)
The key to the capability and adaptability of
the TAC* System is the notion of a Knowledge Ease, where the
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relations and implications of what the programmers have
"taught" TAC* about the real world are stored. The Rules of
the KE are things which TAC* knows or expects tc be true,
along with some consequent results.
To promote fast response and efficient use of
storage space, the KB is divided into at least four major
parts: the dense Index; the Object Rules; the Area Response
Rules; and the Area Analysis Rules.
The Index organizes the physical data into a
useful structure, acting as a dense index into the
relatively sparse Area Response Rule section, thereby
permitting better use of storage. This is necessary to
prevent the need to search the X3 to locate the required
record, or else to have a huge file section, much of which
would not be used (being empty or replicated data)
.
For example, if we used a 16-bit Area State
Summary, the corresponding number of different states would
be 65536 (6UK) , 2 to the 16th, too large for a small
computer, even with a hard disk mass storage, since a record
would be needed for each state. Within the access functions
of the KBMM and the RFM, the Index is used to map the 16-bit
number to a much smaller number of records, with the mapping
being faster than an explicit search. The relation between
56

Area State Summary values and Area Response Rules will be
mary-to-one, with relatively few Response Rules.
An Index for 6UK Area States would require about
one Megabyte of storage for the Rule (key) list alone, with
somewhat less than that for the Response Record list. Since
hard disks are now availible with 5 to 20 Megabyte storage
capacity, this seems well within the range of
microcomputers. This would leave the bulk of mass storage
for the larger Response records.
The Area Rule Response section of the KB
coctains the reactions of the system to a specific value of
the Area State. It is easy to store these reactions in
contiguous records of fixed length, with some breakage
expected. Actions may be messages to the operator,
advice/orders to remote stations, or data transactions which
feed back into the system. All actions are executed by the
system via the Response Driver and the Output Spooling
Prccess as described above.
The Area Analysis Rules are also included in the
KE. These rules may be considered .to be analogous to
procedures, in that they enable the State Monitor to compute
a State Summary value. The State Summary value is an
integer which is the result of the operation of the
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STATE_MOH, and it sufficiently describes the state of the
AOI. It is used by the KEMM to index into the KB Response
Sub-base. The operation and use of these rules is described
in the section on the Area State Monitor, above.
The final section of the K3 is allocated to
Object Rules. Object Hules are used by the Object
Transition Validation (OTV) Module of the DBMS tc validate
state changes resulting from data transactions. The Object
Rules represent physical constraints which limit the ability
to transform from one state tc another (maximum/minimum
speeds, depths, altitudes), as well as known political
constraints (e.g. units of type "X" are not permitted to
operate in this area) . Depending upon the amount of
expertise the system is designed to have, the Object Rule KB
may be quite large and reguire its own index and access
mechanisms. The K3MM can, however, manage changes tc both
the Object Rules and the Area Rules guite easily.
This completes the detailed decription of the TAC*
System at the functional level of the major modules and
subsystems. To futher understand the system it might be
helpful to trace two transactions through the TAC* process.
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C. EXAMPLES OF SYSTEM OPERATION
1 • Data Transaction (DTX)
The Input Spooling Process (ISP) receives a message
from the ship 1 s Commmunication Center as the result of an
Intelligence Report from the Fleet Intelligence Center. A
data transaction (DTX) is sent to the ISP which states that
a Soviet Navy AGI (intelligence gathering ship) is operating
in your area. The DTX is gueued in the ISP until the CON
Input Selector is not busy.
The Input Selector Switch (ISM) receives the
transaction, sees that it is data, and sends it to the DBMS
Ingate, where it is again gueued. When the DBMS signals to
the Ingate that it is ready for the next message, the DTX is-
forwarded. The DBMS determines that the DTX is an object
"transaction, and it calls the Object Transition Validator to
ensure correctness of the change.
This particular transaction reflects a change in
position of the AGI of about 50nm in 2 hours, for an average
speed of 25 knots. The OTV module, accessing the Object
Rules KB, knows that the maximum speed of an AGI is only 20
knots. The OTV sends a message to the operator noting the
discrepancy between rules and data, but it is programmed for
data supremacy; thus the DTX is allowed. The transaction is
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sent to the Outgate, where it is coupled with the Area State
Summary.
The Area State Monitor (STATE_MON) determines that a
change in the AGI's positicn changes the Area State. It
calculates the new area State Summary, and sends it to the
D3MS Outgate. At the Outgate the Area State Summary is sent
to the State Comparision Module and the combined DTX/Area
State Summary is sent to the Log Recorder.
The SCM compares the incoming state with the old one
and determines that a new state exists. The new state is
sent to the Response Fetch Module, where the correct
response is accessed and forwarded to the Response Driver.
The Response -Driver determines that the destination - of the
response is the operator, and it sends the message to the
Output Spooling Process (OSP) . The OSP sends the message to
the TAO, who reads it and notes that the recommended
response is to set a special Emission Control posture to
restrict the amount of technical intelligence availible to
the AGI. TAC* also advises the TAO to alert his own
TECHELINT collection team, and specific emitters of interest
on the AGI are noted.
The reaction of TAC* to the DTX is now completed,
and the TAO has received scund advice. Note that TAC* also
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warned the operator of possible inaccuracy in the data when
the OTV did net completely validate the transaction.
2. Rule Transaction (RTX)
Shortly after the processing of the DTX above,
ancther message is received in the Communications Center.
The Fleet Commander has ordered that all AGI*s of a certain
class be closely investigated for new capabilities. The AGI
in the AOI is one of this type.
Up to the Input Selector, the flow is the same, but
now the message is sent to the State Comparison Module
because it is a Rule Transaction (RTX) . The ISM also sends
the RTX to the KBMS which guiclcly enters it into the KB. At
the SCM, it .is determined th_at the new Rule affects the
current area state. The transaction is sent to the Response
Fetch Module for action.
The RFM accesses the Response part of the
transaction, and formats it for output. It is then sent to
the Response Driver, which in turn sends it to the OSP for
reporting to the operator (or the TAO) . The TAO now is
aware that a message has been received directing
intelligence gathering action against the AGI. Appropriate
steps are listed to put the ship on its maximum readiness
footing for the coming task.
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TAC* again has reacted exactly as desired in
response to a change in knowledge. The ability to quickly
react to the change is crucial, as failure to do so may have
fatal results in the tactical environment.
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IV. DESIGN ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PBEFACE
When analyzing any design, it is important to consider
the original goal and determine how closely one has come to
achieving it. Our specific goal was to design, at the
conceptual level, a computerized decision-support system to
assist tactical commanders in the decision-making process.
We feel that TAC* is such a design. However, with any new
system, both advantages and disadvantages are accrued, and
the TAC* system is no exception. Therefore, this chapter is
an attempt to impartially consider both positive and
negative aspects of our design. Such areas as applicable
domain, modular design, real-time response, and system
intelligence are examined. He will also discuss those
system extensions which, in our opinion, are feasible and
would be relatively easy to implement. Due to continuing
progress in areas such as magnetic bubble memory, 16-bit and
32-bit microcomputers, and systems of computers, we contend
that our "pro jections" of TAC*»s reliability should be
regarded as more than mere speculation. He do accept as
fact, though, that the ultimate test of reliability lies in
the successful implementation of our design.
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B. ADVANTAGES OF TAC*
A TAC* prototype system can offer the lower-level unit
commander an additional tool for use in his decision-making
process. This system is applicable to the tactical
environment and has the capability to intelligently process
large amounts of data in real-time.
1. Applicable Domain
TAC* is a knowledge-based decision-support system.
We believe that such a system is applicable to a specific
domain when the following criteria are met:
• There exists a large amount of information
atcut the specific dcmain.
• Such information is capable of being
decomposed into either data about the domain or knowledge
abcut the domain.
• The control system strategy is adaptable to
computer operation in "domain real-time."
There is general agreement -chat the tactical
environment generates large aiounts of information from
higher-level commanders, from active and passive
intelligence gathering sources, and from changing
environmental conditions (tc name just a few) . Information
frcm any of these origins may easily be represented as
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either pure data, which is stored in a database, or rules to
which the data lust conform. Due to the relatively small
number of available options for a particular tactical
situation (current target, available weapons systems, etc)
,
the system control structure will be able to operate
efficiently. Thus, a knowledge-tased decision-support
system is, theoretically, well suited for application in the
tactical environment. Implementation and utilization will
be the basis for determining if such a system is
realistically applicable in a tactical situation.
2. System Intelligence
A primary goal behind the development of TAC* was to
devise a system capable of assisting the tactical unit
commander in his decision-making process. As such, the
system first had to be intelligent. That is, it had to be
capable of storing large amounts of data, knowing what that
data meant, and how it could be used. System intelligence
had to be intrinsic, rather than provided by the human
element. By correlating applicable rules and data,
intelligence has been designed into the system. Processing
data, analyzing changes, and formulating alternative
solutions can be extremely time-consuming for the human, but
should be accomplished by TAC* in less time. The ultimate
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benefit gained will be to allow the commander more time to
devote to those tactical considerations which cannot be left
to the computer.
We believe that machines should not be considered as
replacements for humans. Rather, the effectiveness of
combining human and machine intelligence should be
maximized. TAC* should allow the computer to perform those
functions which are time-ccnsuming and prone to human error,
while preserving the human factor in areas of judgement and
experience. Such integrated intelligence maximizes the
effectiveness and efficiency of the decision- making process.
We feel that the TAC* -system is.. a_ logical
application of decision-support principles to the area of
tactics. While NTDS gathers information and presents it to
the human operator in a way that promotes analysis, TAC*
will do much more. TAC* will analyze the situation that the
data represents using information stored in its knowledge
base and recommend responses to the operator. TAC* will not
be a glorified information-handling system; it will be an




The obvious question is "Why not extend the present
system rather than introducing a new one?" We contend that
NTCS cannot be extended to achieve the speed of learning
which our system will offer. This is because NTDS is a
static software package; once a version is loaded, system
response is fixed until an updated version is distributed.
On the other hand, TAC* should learn a completely new tactic
in a short period of time by simply updating its knowledge
base.
3. Distributed Svstea
A fully distributed computer system is one in which
the hardware (HW) , software (SW) , and data are resident at
various local sites. It is, therefore, a "stand alone"
system which, if part of a network, communicates with other
sites via messages. The characteristics of TAC* classify
the system in this distributed category. One of the most
important benefits derived from this type of system is the
availability of a complete computer system which can be
devoted entirely to the needs of the local site. In our
tactical environment scenario, this means that the local
commander does not have to compete with other commanders




Given the alternative between a distributed or a
centralized system, the forier was chosen for TAC* even
though traditional military control of subordinate units has
been extremely centralized. As specified in Chapter I, we
believe that the independent operation of tactical units in
any future conflict will promote better control up, rather
than down, the chain of command. This is not to say,
though, that higher level strategic decisions will not be
forthcoming in the form of specific orders. Whether
tactical independence is recognized and planned for by the
command structure or occurs, by necessity, after the fact is
immaterial. We believe that independent unit operation will
be unavoidable and the distributed system- - will. ~i>e. the
principal factor responsible for. survival in the tactical
environment.
Planning a system which supports independent unit
operation provides the most flexibility to the tactical
commander. However, the tailoring of a "stand-alone" system
does not preclude its use in centralized command structures.
Rather than a limited applicability, TAC* should be equally
applicable in either centrally controlled or independent,
isolated scenarios. Consider the following situation:
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A tightly controlled network of computers is
devised to command a tactical group in battle. In the first
minutes of hostile action, the Net Control Station is put
out of action by enemy fire and electronic jamming on the
digital data link is severe. Local tactical units, their
sophisticated centralized computer systems rendered useless
by the confusion, damage, and jamming, overwhelm the
commanders with false and superfluous information. In the
next few minutes, the enemy launches a major offensive
strike and severe losses to friendly forces are suffered.
Because such an occurence is possible, we designed a
system capable of either independent or group operations.
An Input/Output system based on message-passing was included
for efficiency and flexibility. TAC* was conceived as a
modular system, with each module or node performing a
specific function. A group of nodes, communicating by means
of messages, would constitute one complete system called a
"cluster." Nodes will perform the functions of Input,
Output, Control, DB Management, and KB Management. Clusters
will be capable of inter-ccmmunication by means of messages
passed between respective I/O nodes, using any bus protocol
deemed appropriate, thus forming a network of clusters. We
believe this is this is the best way to achieve reliability
ar.d modularity at the least cost.
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4. System of Computers
The design of TAC* has been highly modularized to
allow for the flexibility of implementing it as a system of
microcomputers, rather than using a large mainframe.
Instead of devoting a fixed amount of core memory for the
DEWS, another fixed amount for security and protection, etc.
one small computer may be used for each major function or
module. For example, the Area State Monitor could be
configured to have its own set of rules which it would use
to derive the Area State Summary. The rules would reside in
one microcomputer whose sole responsibility would be to the
Area State Monitor. In essence, such a configuration could
be viewed as being a network within a network. The inner
network would be exclusively devoted to the tactical unit,
with the various unit's systems combining to form a "global"
network. Should one of the machines in the inner network
malfunction, only a portion of the system^ total capability
would be lost. Further, system maintainability and the
isolation of component failures should be more simplified
than those associated with a large, centralized system.
Additionally, the use of a simple control structure with a
small amount of intrinsic knowledge should improve the
chances of a hardware deficiency being repairable by "plug
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and go" strategies. Since nearly all of the system control
information is included in the KB, should any of the several
CPU's fail, replacing it should be straightforward and easy.
Note also that the mechanism of the control
structure is simple and consistent. Adaptability is
achieved by changing KB entries dynamically rather than by
complex control structures. These simple control mechanism
instructions could be programmed in ROM-type storage to
prevent accidental erasure from any source.
From the very beginning, we wanted to design a
system small enough in price and size to afford its use at
the lowest levels of command. This was another reason for
using the modular design. In our opinion, TAC* can be
implemented on a cluster cf single-board computers.
Alternatively, a single minicomputer might suffice for speed
and size but would gain nothing from the message-passing
independence of the nodes, which with SBC's implies "plug
and go" repairs.
The amount of reguired storage for the database and
knowledge base is another tatter. A reasonable estimate of
reguired storage is, we feel, about 20-50 megabytes.
Obviously, semiconductor HAM would reduce access time, but
would increase system cost. A hard disk would bring the
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price down somewhat, but access time would suffer. Also,
the feasibility of the hard disk to the tactical environment
is suspect as they are fairly susceptible to shocks. We
feel that magnetic bubble memory devices are, or soon will
be, dense, cheap, and fast enough to solve this problem. In
addition, it is non-volatile which would hasten recovery
frcni crashes and faults.
The overall concept cf a "system of computers"
shculd prove to be more conducive to the tactical
environment if, for no ether reascn, than its portable
characteristics.
5. Real-Time Response
Much effort has been devoted to develop a knowledge-
based computer system which responds in real-time. One of
the better known systems to date is MYCIN (Stanford
University, 1977)[Ref 5], which was developed as a
diagnostic and therapy consultant for bacterial infections
in the blood. Many of the basic concepts from MYCIN are
also evident in TAC*, however real-time response as defined
for the former was not adequate for our tactical system.
The impact of this re-definition of real-time response was
the necessity to simplify the system control mechanism and
the various interfaces wihtout the loss of system
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capabilities. Certain]^ recent advances in the speed of
medium and small computers should prove to be extremely
helpful in a successful implementation. But, more
importantly, it will be the proper combination of data
structures, links, and the method of treating system rules
in the same manner as data which will achieve tactical real-
time system response for TAC*.
We believe that this real-time response capability
is a most important characteristic of our system, for this
alcne enables the TAC* system to be a useful tool for the
lower level commander. Similar "intelligent" computer
systems, like MYCIN, may be considered by some to be more
sophisticated and powerful than our particular design.
However, it is just this sophistication and power, not to
mention sheer size, that makes such system's real-time
response inappropriate for the tactical environment. TAC*
is intentionally designed without assigning alternative
probabilities (or certainty factors) , an interactive query
capability, and other features used to "prove" to the human
that the computers recommendation is the "right" answer.
In the tactical environment, we hold that the decision-maker
does not have the time to debate relative probabilities with
either another human or a machine. Thus, a tactical real-
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time response can be achieved, but at the expense of
forfeiting a more sophisticated system.
It should be noted, however, that an interactive
capability is recognized as being an important feature.
Such a capability may easily be incorporated for use in
training situations. As the individual becomes proficient
with the system, the logic followed by TAC* to make a
particular recommendation could be examined by the trainee.
The more recommendations TAC* makes which the individual
agrees with, the mere that individual will "trust" the
system^ recommendations in a real-world tactical situation.
The capabilities of a TAC* system can be compared to
other systems like MYCIN, NTDS, or WWMCCS. We believe that
these systems fall short in adaptability, and more
specifically, adaptability in tactical real-time. The
adaptability of our design was the prime motivation for its
conception, with all other considerations being secondary.
In this area, we feel that TAC* promises to be far better
than either NTDS or wWMCCS, which are not at all adaptable
in the sense we have defined.
6, Generalized Concept of TAC*
Many computer systems have been designed for
specific problems. The result of such systems is limited
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application areas. While the original concept of TAC* was
tc provide a tool for the tactical commander, the ultimate
design was conceived to be general in nature. Due to the
method of treating data, rules, and changes to both
identically in our design, the basic system may te used in
any number of other application areas. Data and rules need
not be restricted to those pertaining to our tactical
environment scenario. Whether the data and their
corresponding rules apply to warfare planning, medicine,
automotive production, inventory control, or air traffic
control makes no difference to our system. All types of
information are processed in the same manner. Such system
capability should prove to be an invaluable asset when one
considers diminishing operating budgets combined with
increasing personnel costs.
Perhaps more than anything else, TAC* is a point of
origin from which many ether systems can develop. we
contend that TAC* is a notion of how intelligent computer
systems should be designed to achieve maximum system
adaptability. Actual implementations of TAC* will vary,
especially in the internal operations of the DBMS and the
K3BS. We believe that the general concept of our design is
a significant and unique characteristic of the system. No
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system re-configuration is needed to implement totally
different types of problem environments if the basic system
is properly implemented. All one need do is to identify to
TAC* a new Database and new Knowledge Base which are
applicable to the desired domain of interest.
C. DISADVAHTAGES OF TAC*
The acceptance or non-acceptance of TAC* may be viewed
as being dependent upon two major factors: real and
perceived system disadvantages. Real disadvantages are more
easily isolated and, hopefully, can be negated by system
modifications. However, perceived disadvantages are not
easily overcome. Human receptiveness will probably be more
crucial than technical system limitations.
1. Human Receptiveness
Even though computer technology has been
inccrporated into washing machines, watches, children's
toys, video games, etc. many people still view the computer
as a mysterious "black box." Very little resistence to
computerization is evident so long as the computer provides
entertainment or decreases the human workload. However, the
slightest hint that computers might participate in the human
decision-making process results in human resistance.
76

TAC*, being typified as a knowledge- based decision-
support system, will probably be regarded by many people as
a threat to the "ultimate" human characteristic: the ability
to reason. Such people will probably not recognize that
TAC* and similar intelligent computer systems are merely
attempting to simulate and augment the human decision-making
process. Regardless of the purported sophistication of the
system, and more specifically the system's software, the
computer only does that which the human has programmed it to
do. MYCIN is led to a particular diagnosis based upon pre-
assigned certainty factors and current test results, both of
which are input to the system by qualified medical
personnel. Likewise, TAC* makes a "decision" or
recommendation based upon the current answer to various
"WHAT... IF" guestions. The list cf possible answers are
pre-programmed into the system by humans.
Such a simple and logical explanation may fall on
deaf ears, though, as most humans are irrational when they
feel threatened. Therefore some, and perhaps the majority,
of people may simply refuse to accept TAC* for what it
really is: another tool at man's disposal.
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2. Complexity of System
Because TAC* has been highly modularized, there will
necessarily be a significant amount of data exchanged
between modules. Even though much effort was devoted to the
simplification of the modules and their interfaces, the
complexity of the tactical environment itself imposes a
limitation upon system simplification. Although the tasks
of the individual modules are quite simple, the resultant
overall design is more complex than that which was
originally conceived.
Complexity has several disadvantages and TAC* will
not be immune to problems. A complex design is more
expensive in terms of both dollars and man-hours spent to
implement and maintain, increases the possibility of system
"bugs", is more difficult for the average person to
understand, and therefore, tc accept, and normally
experiences a higher incidence of "software tampering" than
does a less complex design.
People tend to relate complexity to reliability.
Due to the stakes involved in the tactical environment,
system reliability is a ncn-negctiabie requirement. The
perception of design complexity may also create the




Just as in the human decision- making process, the
effectiveness of a computerized decision-support system is
directly related to the quality of the information used to
make a particular decision. Therefore, some method of
system control must be enforced to insure that only
authorized rule changes are input, only reliable data
updates are made, and all unauthorized access attempts are
denied and reported. Such protection and security
requirements are not easily accomplished, as evidenced by
the vast number of both civilian and military research
projects that are cn-going in these areas. Further, the
reliability of data seems to imply that some type of formal
or informal mathematical probability must be used. Anything
shcrt of probability is mere speculation.
The result of making an error in the tactical
environment could be fatal to the single unit and could have
disastrous effects on the national goals of the forces
involved. Because it is feasible to configure TAC* in such
a way that it could actually ccntrol various weapons
systems, some form of over-ride (or "fail-safe") mechanism
must be incorporated to prevent a potential catastrophe from
occuring. In its basic form, TAC* is characterized as just
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another tool. But in this advanced form, TAG* is both the
tool and the wielder of the tool (subject to human
supervision)
. If it is net properly used, unpredictable
action may result.
Total system control is mandatory, but may not be




Implementation of the TAC* system should be done as
a cluster of 16- or 32-bit single-board computers, using
magnetic bubble memory as storage for the DB and KB. A
language suited to the message-passing environment and which
is amenable to bit-checking operations should be used.
2. Extensions
An interactive query system (IQS) similar to that
used by MYCIN might be useful (see previous discussion in
this chapter). Such a capability could be used by the
tactical commander or by a student to extract from the
system the path of logic used in reaching a particular
decision. This information will be available in the form of
Log Recorder entries. An IQS module could access the Log
file as its own database, with read-only protection, of
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course. 3ecause of the time constraints of the tactical
commander, this capability might be limited to training
purposes.
Additionally, the log file could be read by an Error
analysis Module which would detect, through comparison
between recommendations and actual events, which rules of
the knowledge base were inconsistent with actual
occurrences. These rules could be flagged to the operator
for correction, thus providing a valuable service in
maintaining the accuracy of the knowledge base.
A capability for the system to develop rules on its
own could also be included. Rule generation could be
accomplished by rote learning or by the laws of induction
and deduction. This might present a problem to the
tactician in that he would not know exactly what rules
explicitly exist in the knowledge base, but TAC* could
identify these to the TAO as logical extensions to its
programmed rules.
Finally, TAG* could be extended to implement the
recommendations or the decisions which it makes. TAC* would
then be a decision-making system, rather than a decision-
support system. Constraints could be placed on this
capability, such as positive control or control by negation.
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If done, the capability of a TAC* platform to respond
quickly to all threats would be greatly enhanced.
3. Warning
When a computer system enters the realm of tactical
decision-making , it becomes "responsible" for many human
lives. This situation will cot be borne any easier as
situations become more complex. What is placed in the
knowledge base of a TAC* system must accurately reflect the
policy of the military and be approved by a competent
authority. Some method of testing or verifying the
correctness of the system must be considered and used. This
must be accomplished before TAC* assumes the role of
computerized decision-maker.
E. C0SCLJ5ION
In the final analysis, we believe that we have
accomplished that which we set out to accomplish. The top-
level, conceptual design of a knowledge-based, intelligent
decision-support system has been presented and the bases of
our design have been made known. The proposed system, we
feel, will be small, flexible, and adaptable. It is our
opinion that TAC* will prove helpful in the design of future
tactical command and control systems.
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Continued work is needed to refine the concept and to
test its practicality by various implementat ion strategies.
However, the basis for TAC* must be kept foremost in any
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